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I. The Future of the Right to Counsel
An examination of Gideon v. Wainwright1 after fifty years
involves both its past failures and accomplishments and its
future impact. Gideon’s legacy is enormously positive with the
expansion of rights to so many indigent defendants in need of
representation against criminal charges that could deny them life
and liberty, but its inadequacies in fulfilling its full promise are
glaring as well. These competing themes are reflected in many
articles that are part of this symposium.2 I choose to focus
principally on its future, which, of course, will likely be guided by
its past.

1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding
Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290–91 (2013)
(proposing a number of measures to reduce the range of cases covered by Gideon
with the purpose of preserving its core); Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About
Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1309, 1335–44 (2013) (suggesting, inter alia, exploration of nonlawyer
alternatives for indigent representation); Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed:
Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 883, 916–24 (2013) (suggesting and critiquing a number of approaches
both from the perspective of the liberal, conservative, and pragmatic agenda);
Abbe Smith, Gideon Was a Prisoner: On Criminal Defense in a Time of Mass
Incarceration, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1390–91 (2013) (arguing to address
the problem of limited defense services by reducing overcriminalization and
reducing our massive incarceration rate).
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In this period of reflection on Gideon, I have had the
opportunity to participate in three conferences examining this
landmark decision. The first, which was held early in 2010,3
recognized the difficulties in fulfilling Gideon’s promise of
effective assistance to all those entitled to an attorney under the
Sixth Amendment, but it differed from the latter two occurring in
2012 in its degree of (perhaps unrealistic) optimism. The latter
two, including the wonderful symposium at Washington and Lee
University School of Law,4 exhibit their share of optimism, but
they contain many more voices suggesting reexamination of the
dimensions of Gideon and its costs and suggesting alternatives to
traditional attorney representation.
For me, the obvious and sufficient explanation for the
difference in focus is twofold. The first is the recognition of the
magnitude of the economic downturn that was not yet fully
appreciated in 2009. The second is the intervening mid-term
election in 2010, which changed the conversation and the political
landscape at the national, state, and local levels with respect to
resources available for public purposes. While I wish we could
address this new reality with traditional responses, I doubt that
is possible and therefore applaud the new voices and proposals.
They give us the chance to remake the system of representation
of those charged with crime for the better and provide additional
tools to meet the challenges of a much more difficult
environment.
In considering new critiques and proposals, however, I
suggest limitations both on the criticism of Gideon and on the
types of proposals that should be entertained. Gideon can hardly
be criticized because it has led to excessive spending on unneeded
services. I have not seen the evidence that either excessive
spending has occurred or that defense services are unneeded,
particularly in the modern world of growing complexity in
criminal litigation. While some government programs may be
3. This earlier symposium was titled Broke and Broken: Can We Fix Our
State Indigent Defense System? It was held at the University of Missouri School
of Law in Columbia, Missouri on February 26, 2010.
4. The other more recent symposium concerned the Sixth Amendment,
including the right to counsel, and was held at Texas Tech University School of
Law on March 30, 2012.
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criticized as fostering lavish expenditures and bloated
bureaucracy, those are not criticisms of indigent defense. Instead,
compensation for defenders is recognized as low and often
inadequate, and work requirements are typically excessive.5 The
services are provided to those whom the government has charged
with a crime in the limited area where their liberty may be
denied.6 These legal services are provided only to those
determined to be unable to afford their own lawyer under
standards of indigency that are generally very demanding.7
Those who support Gideon’s promise should be willing to
embrace reform solutions that provide services in a more cost
efficient way. Doctrinal retrenchments on what may be
considered marginal elements of Gideon’s requirements,8
however, should be supported only if such reductions come with
guarantees of improvements elsewhere. I do not believe that
monetary savings resulting from reductions in the scope of
Gideon offered by its supporters will produce compensating
increases to services within the core by heretofore resistant
public officials.
I believe that such quid pro quo exchanges are not available.
First, I doubt that there is any realistic mechanism for
negotiation. The process of change requires two steps: doctrinal
5. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the
Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Outcomes, 122 YALE L.
J. 154, 162–64 (2012) (presenting a study documenting the low pay received for
demanding work of Philadelphia-based lawyers providing indigent defense).
6. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (limiting right to
counsel cases where the defendant is imprisoned and excluding cases when the
defendant is only fined); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002)
(interpreting Scott to apply to cases where defendant is sentenced to
imprisonment and the sentence is suspended and placed on probation because
imprisonment is the result of the sentence if the probation is revoked).
7. See John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How
States Use the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of their Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1176 (2013)
(describing the various ways indigency is defined and demonstrating the
extreme level of poverty generally required to qualify for appointed counsel
without some level of contribution from the accused).
8. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 1290 (arguing that the extension to cases
carrying no immediate incarceration but only a probationary sentence that may
result in incarceration upon violation of probation was a step too far and should
be eliminated as part of a bargain to shrink Gideon’s scope to preserve its core).
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change by the United States Supreme Court and a change in
funding. Unless the Supreme Court undertakes what it has not
done before, it will not link doctrinal change to funding. Indeed, I
have difficulty imagining a mechanism that would accomplish
this purpose and do not believe past cases provide any models. As
a result, the reduction in rights at the doctrinal level must
happen first and cannot be linked to the political realities that
must occur at multiple levels throughout the state indigent
defense systems.9 Next, I believe there is no obvious level of
reductions that would be considered sufficient to justify the
expenditure of scarce public resources by those states and
localities that now systemically underfund Gideon.
Finally, I suggest that any reforms recognize the human and
institutional elements of meaningful public defense employment.
Many law students and lawyers who enter that work today do so
because they recognize its importance. They, however, are not
unrealistic about uncertainty and the need to prepare for other
potential careers. If indigent defendants are to be given what I
believe is due under the Sixth Amendment—the prospect of
representation at the quality level of those able to afford their
own attorney—then lawyers who enter indigent defense must be
first rate. These lawyers may be economically trained, but for
reasons of self-interest in an uncertain world, they cannot be on
an isolated track that leads only to a limited practice option in
the underpaid world of indigent defense.10
9. The inadequacies of Gideon are felt at the state, rather than the
federal, level. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 894 (introducing the “failure” of
Gideon to provide for indigent defense). An often-missed reality of state criminal
justice operations and reforms is that those systems are generally disorganized
rather than highly hierarchical. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Sixth Amendment
Rights to Fairness: The Touchstones of Effectiveness and Pragmatism, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“[T]he vast majority of serious criminal prosecutions
are handled in the much more chaotic and underfunded state courts.”).
10. I applaud the efforts of Professor Don Dripps in looking at fundamental
reform in a broad, conceptual way and trying to cure the inadequacies of Gideon
by limiting the supply of cases that need to be handled or the supply of lawyers
and resources to handle them. One potential mechanism he suggests is to make
the credential to provide defense services more readily available by developing a
different track in legal education. See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 129–30 (2013) (arguing that a separate track in legal
education would both address issues in the cost of obtaining a law degree and
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II. The Need for Excellent Lawyers to Represent the Truly
Innocent Armed Only with Reasonable Doubt, Which Is
Perceived Objectively as “Potential Innocence”
I spent seven eventful years at the Public Defender Service
for the District of Columbia (PDS). I have written about a set of
cases I handled there that raised difficult factual issues about
guilt and innocence.11 I am a firm believer in two propositions
regarding the role of quality indigent defense in protecting the
innocent. First, many truly innocent defendants are hidden
among reasonable doubt cases. A substantial percentage of these
truly innocent defendants have no real prospects of conclusively
proving their innocence on the model of DNA exonerations, which
is often considered the standard for “actual innocence.”12 Second,
fulfill a need for indigent representation). That effort causes me considerable
concern because it diminishes the excellence, the standing, and the career
options of those trained in a more economical way for the specific task of
criminal representation. I suggest that the problems associated with this
particular proposal would be insuperable.
11. See Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for
Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO.
L. REV. 931, 954–57 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent]
(providing experiences representing apparently typical clients shown in some
instances by chance events to be factually innocent and in others to have
concrete but unknowable prospects for innocence); Robert P. Mosteller, Why
Defense Counsel Cannot, but Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1, 1–6 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller, Caring About Innocence] (arguing that
although defense counsels’ feelings about the guilt or innocence of their clients
are irrelevant or even dangerous to the quality of representation they deliver,
such concerns, particularly about innocence, nonetheless exist).
12. The concept of actual innocence plays a key role in the terminology of
the innocence movement. See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 71
(2000) (providing the title for a major book describing important early successes
in the innocence movement). One influence of the high standard of proof
associated with this term is exemplified by its use in connection with the
emergence of a substantive constitutional claim of habeas corpus sufficient to
bar execution, as seen in Herrera v. Collins. See 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (“[I]n a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim . . . .”). More generally, Brandon Garrett states:
The word “innocence” is used casually in the media and by lawyers,
convicts, scholars, and courts. I define the innocent as those who did
not commit the charged crime. Even though they know they are
actually innocent, many lack the evidence to prove their innocence to
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the best prospect for protecting these innocent defendants is to
provide them with excellent legal assistance.
I chose the term “potential innocence” for my title to be an
accurate descriptive term that was not tailored to capture the
public’s imagination, which I believe is an unfortunate reality of
this type of innocence. On the other hand, I mean to convey by
the term that truly innocent defendants are found among
reasonable doubt cases and that these potentially innocent
defendants when well represented are not acquitted because of
legal technicalities. Many are just as truly innocent as defendants
exonerated by DNA in every sense but one: their innocence
cannot be demonstrated definitively.
The types of cases I am contemplating here may be difficult
to visualize in the abstract. To help make these cases more
concrete, I have described examples from cases I handled in my
practice at PDS,13 but I need not recite those here. Instead, the
Gideon case itself provides a helpful example.14 And the work of
Gideon’s attorney, W. Fred Turner, at the retrial after remand
from the United States Supreme Court, shows the importance of

others, making it difficult to distinguish them from the convicts and
prisoners who falsely claim innocence.
Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1645–46 (2008)
(citation omitted). Although not always employed consistently, I find that the
term actual innocence is generally used—and I use it in this Article—to describe
those cases that Professor Garrett would categorize in his study as “substantial
claims” of innocence. See id. at 1647–49 (discussing substantial claims of
innocence). These cases are epitomized by “complete exonerations,” in which
evidence of innocence that is highly dispositive of identity exculpates the
defendant, employing DNA or other technology-based proof such as video
evidence. See id. (discussing substantial claims of innocence); see also Emily
Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085–86 (2011) (“The
media and legal scholars often use the terms ‘actually innocent’ and ‘factually
innocent’ to describe a person who had nothing to do with a crime: he is not
actually the person who committed the crime; the facts show that somebody else
did it.”).
13. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 11, at 938–59
(describing the difficulty of separating those who may be innocent but have only
strong arguments of reasonable doubt from those who are innocent).
14. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) (describing the
facts of the case and the events and proceedings that led to the landmark
Supreme Court decision).
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good lawyering in protecting that potential innocence. Turner’s
work is ably described by Professor Abbe Smith.15
As I read the facts of Gideon’s case, I cannot conclude he is
innocent because of the absence of any firm exculpatory
evidence and the large number of coins he had in his pockets,
which seems to match the missing proceeds of the burglarized
pool hall.16 Even more absolutely, I cannot put him in the
category of those who would in today’s nomenclature be
considered actually innocent.17 However, he may well have been
innocent—not under some legal technicality—but truly
innocent. The key problem is that we do not know, and along
with many other cases in this category today, we can never
know for certain because unchallengeable evidence of innocence
does not exist. Gideon’s case illustrates the uncertainties we
face in determining innocence, and the work of his attorney
reflects the best that most defense attorneys can ever do to
protect the truly innocent. Such attorneys are the difference
between conviction and acquittal for defendants who have
potential, sometimes strong potential, for being truly innocent.
III. Defenders Think They Know Who Is Guilty, and They Do
Much of the Time, but Not Necessarily When It Matters Most
In my writing, I noted that the job of a public defender is not
to concentrate on whether a client is innocent or guilty.18 Indeed,
it is almost antithetical to that concern in that public defenders’
work must presume the worth of each client and the value of
15. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1375, 1378–79 (recounting Turner’s
effective defense work in the areas of jury selection and cross-examination of the
key prosecution witness).
16. See LEWIS, supra note 14, at 232–36 (describing the large amount of
change in Gideon’s pockets and its impact as circumstantial proof that he
burglarized the pool hall because a cigarette machine and the juke box had been
broken into and coins taken).
17. See cases and materials cited supra note 12 and accompanying text
(discussing the concept of actual innocence).
18. See Mosteller, Caring About Innocence, supra note 11, at 1–6 (noting
that concentrating on the question of the accused client’s guilt has negative
ethical consequences).
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mounting at the minimum a due process battle against the
prosecution. Public defenders with adequate resources seek to
provide excellent representation to all.19
My job as a public defender was to help the people I met in
lockup regardless of who they were or whether they were
innocent or guilty. I noted, however, that the perception a client
might well be innocent had an impact on me (and I assume other
defenders) even though I knew it should not.20
I felt a kinship in my perspective as a public defender to the
attitude exhibited by Tommy Lee Jones in The Fugitive when he
responded to Harrison Ford’s claim that he was innocent with the
memorable line, “I don’t care.”21 Just as Deputy Marshal Sam
Gerad, played by Jones, could not function in his professional role
if he made decisions based on his personal beliefs about the guilt
or innocence of fugitives, defenders cannot survive in the job if
they assume they defend only the innocent. Thoughts
nevertheless turn in that direction.
It is quite difficult in many cases to have confidence in the
difference between the innocent, the likely innocent, the possibly
innocent, and the probably guilty. Of course, there are cases
where guilt is almost certainly established, but my experience is
that guilt was rarely established for defense counsel on the basis
of the client’s confidential admission. Rather, it was established
on the basis of the evidence and information I encountered
through discovery and investigation. Conceptually, however,
there are two basic groups of cases: Group 1, the innocent (with
varying degrees of certainty) and Group 2, the guilty (also with
varying degrees of certainty). Group 2 is the much larger of the
two, and it clearly should be since the police and prosecutors have
the ability to investigate and prosecute cases on the basis of the
apparent strength of the proof.

19. See id. at 5–8 (describing the attitude of defense attorneys as not caring
about innocence because professionally and practically they cannot care and do
the lawyering tasks entailed effectively).
20. See id. at 13–22 (examining the handling of innocent clients’ cases).
21. THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993).
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IV. The Theoretically Easy Answer of Good Lawyers for All
One solution that avoids difficult problems of choice among
defendants is to provide excellent legal services to all.22 That
approach would help Group 1 establish their innocence, and it
would provide important benefits to Group 2 in addition to the
possibility of an acquittal. Proving an effective defense is clearly
indicated for both groups under the specific guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment and the fundamental concepts of due process
and equal protection that formed the constitutional foundations
of Gideon.23 Legal doctrine clearly provides broad support for full
representation of both groups; the only impediments, which are
huge, are developing practical support to fund broad, effective
representation, and to find the means within our available public
resources to do so.
I personally favor this broad approach and believe that
innocence protection broadly conceived can and should be part of
the supporting basis for expanded funding.24 My contention is
that uncertainty about innocence and the difficulty of a defender
confidently determining each defendant’s probable level of
innocence or guilt strongly counsel for treating all clients as
worthy of a quality defense, lest some who are innocent are
wrongfully and needlessly convicted.

22. I recognize that PDS was unusually well resourced. As a result, it in
fact permitted lawyers to provide, not the type of representation the wealthy can
afford, but effective counsel to all its clients, which I believe is generally true for
federal public defenders offices.
23. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (locating the
right within the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment with justification
based on fundamental principles of due process supplemented by the demands
of equal justice before the law).
24. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 11, at 937, 985–87
(describing a public role of innocent protection in representing those with
reasonable doubt cases and its potential to provide support for adequate funding
of indigent defense).
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V. The Harsh Present Reality Based in Fiscal and Empathy
Limitations
The arguments set out immediately above for robust
implementation of Gideon’s promise are, I believe, well taken and
should be continued. Economic and political events, however, that
have moved at a rapid pace over the past few years as the impact
of the great recession has settled upon us have altered, in my
judgment, the likelihood of success in developing change in
support for indigent defense using general innocence arguments.
We have entered a period where public resources are quite scarce
and are likely to remain scarce for the foreseeable future, and
where a substantial portion of the public expresses a declining
interest in government providing services generally and are
arguably particularly resistant to providing services to those at
the margins of society.25 Those charged with crime, especially
those who have substantial criminal records, likely epitomize the
groups for whom concern is lacking.26
I will note two suggestive pieces of information indicating the
magnitude of the change in state financing status. First, the
25. Conservatives complain frequently that the government takes income
from those who work and are generating jobs to provide benefits to what is most
provocatively termed the “moocher class”—terminology used by syndicated talk
show host Neal Boortz. See Neal Boortz on the Moocher Class, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2010/10/14/neal_
boortz_on_the_moocher_class.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the
moocher class as “people who are ‘perfectly content to live at the expense of
others’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also AYN RAND,
THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 32 (1964).
Parasites, moochers, looters, brutes and thugs can be of no value to a
human being—nor can he gain any benefit from living in a society
geared to their needs, demands and protection, a society that treats
him as a sacrificial animal and penalizes him for his virtues in order
to reward them for their vices, which means: a society based on the
ethics of altruism.
Id.
26. On the other hand, even conservative state politicians such as Governor
Rick Snyder of Michigan recognize that indigent defense is an obligation of
government. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2011-12 (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/mi_executiveorderno2011-12_10132011.pdf
(noting the state’s interest in effective defense for indigents and the need for
adequate funding in signing an executive order establishing the Indigent
Defense Commission).
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State Budget Crisis Task Force issued a report in July 2012
stating that the fiscal crisis for the states will continue for a long
period after the economy revives.27 This is because of expected
increasing health care costs, a pattern of underfunded pensions,
generally disregarded infrastructure needs, and eroding
revenues, a part of which will be expected federal budget cuts.28
Second, a number of states cut services, such as school funding
with rising class sizes, when revenues declined substantially
during the worst of the recession and have chosen not to restore
services to their earlier level even as revenues have rebounded.29
This response may just be prudence in waiting to see if economic
improvements continue, but the initial decision is consistent with
an effort to decrease the level of services by holding them at
levels prompted by the recessionary budget crisis.30
One plausible view of the next decade is that spending by
state and local governments for all services will not only not
increase, but may well decline. We could see a situation in which
citizens are expecting and receiving less in a broad range of
public services. Spending for indigent defense in this
environment will be hard pressed to hold its own, and increases
will be unrealistic.
The expectation of reduced federal discretionary spending for
a sustained period of time adds to the bleak picture of hope for
substantial increased government outlays for indigent defense. In
27. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, FULL REPORT 6, 50 (July 31,
2012), http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-theState-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf (stating that states will continue to
suffer economically after the recession partly because the great share of their
tax bases are highly economically sensitive); Mary Williams Walsh & Michael
Cooper, Gloomy Forecast for States, Even if Economy Rebounds, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2012, at A1 (discussing the report).
28. Walsh & Cooper, supra note 27; see also STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK
FORCE, supra note 27, at 2–3.
29. See Jim Siegel, Ohio’s Rainy-Day Fund Goes from 89 Cents to $482
Million, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 4, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/local/2012/07/04/surplus-goes-from-89-cents-to-482-million.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013) (using Ohio, which saw a surplus of $235 million and refused to
spend it, as an example) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. Rahm Emanuel stated in November 2008, “Never let a serious crisis go
to waste. What I mean by that is it’s an opportunity to do things you couldn’t do
before.” A Forty-Year Wish List, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at A14.
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my judgment, one of the most promising recent proposals to
improve the quality of indigent services was made by Professor
Norm Lefstein.31 A central component of his proposal is a new
federal center for defense services and the availability of federal
funding to support model programs.32 Without federal leadership
and the support of federal funding, which are intertwined and are
now quite problematic both in the near term and the likely long
term, significant reforms are far less likely to occur.
These changes in the environment have caused me to
recalibrate my thinking on how to approach innocence protection
and support of indigent defense. Realism in a likely harsh form
counsels a less optimistic view of what arguments will win
funding support. I now expect that a concern with innocence may
not have enough power figuratively to move the “funding needle”
except when it is innocence in the clearest sense. The innocence
movement’s standard of actual innocence, which I believe is
underinclusive, may well be the only form of innocence that has
significance to the public and therefore to legislators.
One sub-point that I sense is likely of relevance is that unless
the person is relatively uninvolved in crime or the crime where
innocence is shown is very serious (e.g., homicide) and far beyond
the level of the accused’s previous criminal involvement, being
innocent of the particular crime may not matter very much to the
public.33 I have noted that I believe many of those who are not
demonstrably innocent, but innocent in fact, may have the type of
background in crime that suggests their involvement in the
particular crime under investigation.34 A person picked from a
photo array assembled by the police for display to an armed
31. See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 928–29 (2004)
(describing a proposal that depends on federal funding and the creation of a
federal center for defense services).
32. Id.
33. See Mosteller, Caring About Innocence, supra note 11, at 41–43
(relating the story of Lee Wayne Hunt, who was convicted solely on the basis of
informant testimony); see also D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780–82 (2007) (discussing some elements of a potential
typology).
34. Mosteller, Caring About Innocence, supra note 11, at 41–43.
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robbery victim, for example, may have committed other similar
robberies but not be guilty of the particular robbery.35 Or she may
be the companion of a drug dealer who herself has prior
involvement with the use and sale of drugs but may not have
been involved in the specific drug deal at issue in the
prosecution.36 If it ever was enough to garner public support,
innocence of the precise crime charged, but not general innocence,
may no longer be enough to justify increased funding for indigent
defense.37
In particular cases, and for those who know the individual
charged and the local facts, all possibilities of potential innocence
will no doubt continue to matter. Occasionally, when a case with
compelling facts attracts attention or when it involves salient
stereotypes, good lawyering, including defense work, is
appreciated.38 Innocence, the possibility of innocence, due process
for the guilty, and providing assistance to fellow citizens dealing
with an unforgiving governmental structure should all matter as
values served by the system that Gideon spawned. A high
percentage of the work of those who defend the indigents,
however, aids clients who are typically guilty, even if not culpable
in the charged crime, or who are clearly guilty but are only
35. See id. at 23–26 (describing a former client whose case fit this pattern).
36. See United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1035–37 (4th Cir.
1992) (describing the fact pattern of a female companion of a clearly guilty male
defendant in which her guilt was uncertain as to the specific drug distribution
scheme prosecuted, but who was obviously knowledgeable about drug sales
generally).
37. To my eye, Clarence Gideon may well be an exception to my general
sense that the potential for innocence by one who has a substantial record and
therefore might be considered figuratively one of the “usual suspects” cannot
capture the public imagination. As his case is generally described, particularly
when Gideon’s picture accompanies that description, his case seems an outrage
and innocence is almost beside the point. I suspect my reaction may be based on
what seems to be a very long sentence for a fragile and elderly man who is
apparently harmless, has endured a substantial imprisonment already, and is
noble in his demand for fair treatment. Switch a few of those stereotypes to the
modern day young inter-city defendant convicted of drug trafficking, and I
suspect the reaction begins to change markedly.
38. For example, both Trayvon Martin, the decedent, and George
Zimmerman, the defendant, have personal characteristics and represent
political and societal positions that could make substantial elements of the
public supportive of good lawyering for their positions.
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insisting on their rights to due process. For most defendants, the
public likely sees excellent defense work as taking advantage of
procedural protections considered “legal technicalities.”39
VI. Those Who Care About Innocence Should Stick Together: The
Argument that Public Defenders Protect Some of the Innocent May
Be Inadequate, but It Is the Best Argument Available, and It Has
the Benefit of Being True
Despite its relative weaknesses in the current environment,
innocence protection is likely the best available option to develop
public support for indigent defense. The innocence movement’s
standard of almost absolute proof, however, effectively limits its
support of Gideon’s command to a small subset of defendants. On
the other hand, despite being narrowly focused, the innocence
movement has been a strong enabling force for important
procedural protections for those charged with crime.
A. Help Those Innocent Defendants We Can with Arguments for
Innocence
Given the difficulty of raising support for lawyers for the
indigent in general, second best solutions may be in order. Some
of these that tend to separate the innocent from the guilty may be
the most effective responses for those who are truly innocent,
with the paths of advocacy diverging based on the clarity and
availability of the proof.40 For example, greater access to DNA
testing can help the innocent in cases where DNA trace evidence
is definitive. But emphasis on DNA can suggest that those
39. See, e.g., Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of
Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 695 n.2 (2006) (presenting one A.B.A.
sponsored poll in which 73% of respondent consumers believed that “lawyers
spend too much time finding technicalities to get criminals released” (citation
omitted)).
40. See Mosteller, supra note 9, at 12 (arguing that different conceptions of
fairness can lead to support for all defendants or only to defendants who are
likely innocent, and that reforms that focus on the latter may have the effect of
reducing support for broader measures).
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without proof of exoneration are not only not innocent, but are
likely guilty. Proof of the type offered by DNA tends to give the
public false hope of certainty regarding both innocence and—
where it is not established—guilt.
B. Assist the Innocent with Organizational and Procedural
Mechanisms that Engender Neutrality in Investigation and
Charging and Augment Reliability
Another approach is to provide greater neutrality to
investigating agencies and prosecutors. This approach could help
both the clearly guilty and those who are stereotyped as guilty by
investigators caught up in the competitive process of ferreting out
crime. But it would not help those who are implicated by a
thorough, neutral investigation and instead need a vigorous
challenge to the government’s case in order to give effect to
potential reasonable doubts.
C. Open up the Information: Full Open-File Discovery
The one reform that I believe has the greatest potential to
aid indigent defense across the board is full, open-file discovery.
Such broad discovery makes defending cases cheaper; it aids
defense counsel with limited investigative resources; and it can
unearth the truth. Realistically, it can also aid the clearly guilty
by permitting fabrication of a defense or witness tampering.
Broad discovery’s potential to aid the guilty is the major basis on
which full, open-file discovery is often resisted, and it is hardly
the basis on which any supporter can argue for an extension of
disclosure. With sufficient protections and reciprocity of discovery
obligations for the defense, however, I believe its value is
undeniable and helps protect many of the same interests upon
which Gideon rests.
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VII. Support Reforms that Reduce the Impact of Inadequate
Counsel but Not Those that Diminish the Command for
Excellent Counsel
In the near future, and perhaps in the long run, there is little
prospect of substantially improving the level of funding for
indigent services. That point, however, does not justify reducing
the demand for excellence. That demand is fulfilled in some
situations, such as in federal court, and it should not be
diminished. Moreover, when enforced through ineffective
assistance claims, it provides relief for potentially innocent
defendants since the standard for reversal effectively requires a
showing of a plausible prospect of innocence.41 I have not seen a
persuasive argument for how diminishing the requirement will
result in any guarantee for greater provision of resources.
My proposals for reform, which include administrative
changes to make the prosecution function and the investigative
and forensic process more neutral, and for open-file discovery,
have a different impact than diminishing the demand for
excellent representation or reducing the scope of the right to
counsel. Instead, they supplement or provide benefits to the
efforts of defense counsel. I suggest reforms of that nature are to
be advanced, particularly those that do not require extensive
monetary outlays to be effective.42

41. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (requiring that
the defendant demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result would have been different”).
42. See Mosteller, supra note 9, at 15–16 (emphasizing the importance of
fostering reforms, even if ostensibly based on constitutional commands, which
entail limited costs because of the unlikelihood that they will be fully
implemented in a criminal justice system faced with woefully inadequate
resources). The fact that substantial expenditures are not required does not
suggest these reforms will be easily accomplished politically or organizationally.
I believe, however, that in the present environment, requirements of substantial
financial outlays make the proposal not only ultimately difficult to accomplish,
but also likely to be recognized as a nonstarter that therefore has no chance of
success.
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VIII. Conclusion

I believe robust Sixth Amendment protections, including
assisting individuals in navigating the criminal justice system,
are worthy arguments to support indigent defense. But I am
becoming convinced they will not prevail with the public in the
current economic and political environment. Innocence protection
is the only available option to develop public support, but I
believe the innocence movement’s standard of almost absolute
proof makes using innocence as a motivating factor very difficult
for all but a small subset of defendants who can demonstrate
innocence or can connect with the public on a personal level.
These are not the bases for broad support for indigent defense.
Unfortunately, the innocence argument that can prevail is likely
not figuratively a tide powerful enough to lift all boats.
My sense of hope and reality collide. Some levels of hope
must realistically be abandoned. Those who support Gideon are
likely unable to convince the public of the value of broad support
for indigent defense in that the values it protects are either not
considered worthy at all or are considered insufficiently
important when weighed against other unmet public needs.
Actual innocence is likely the only realistically available
argument to further Gideon, but its power is only sufficient to
carry the day for a limited group of cases.
Innocence concerns, however, provide a modicum of leverage
for due process arguments in general and for support for a
substantial right to counsel in particular. The arguments for
innocence among the group I highlight—the potentially innocent
who are only able to show degrees of doubt regarding their guilt—
are likely inadequate in their own right. Nevertheless, they are
important to prevent isolation of the effective innocence
argument to the narrow group of those defendants demonstrated
to be actually innocent, which could even further disadvantage all
others charged with crime.

